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Abstract
This paper investigates whether long-run price reversals persist in stocks that
have significantly outperformed or underperformed the market. Consistent with
previous studies, the results show that there are sizeable positive abnormal returns to a long-term contrarian strategy of investing in stocks with significant
prior underperformance. However, these positive abnormal returns are driven
by low-priced stocks, and stocks with very low market capitalizations. When
the investment universe is narrowed to remove very small companies and lowpriced stocks, there is no longer a statistically significant return difference between portfolios of stocks with significant prior outperformance and significant
prior underperformance.
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Introduction

Many in the literature have debated the degree to which capital markets are efficient,
and whether investment returns are at all predictable. Studies of stock market autocorrelation, for example, have shed light on whether short-run and long-run historical
returns are predictive of future returns. Many studies contend that short-run positive
autocorrelation of returns or ”momentum” persists, but some have also argued that
long-run negative autocorrelation of returns may follow.
Multi-factor asset pricing models help explain a large share of the variation in
expected excess stock returns. These models use metrics including size and valuation
to explain cross-sectional differences in excess returns. However, some have questioned
whether these variables are sufficient to explain expected excess stock returns. Some
argue that behavioral issues including investor overconfidence and overreaction are
also explanatory of returns.
This study examines whether prior abnormal returns are indicative of future abnormal returns for stocks that have experienced significant outperformance or underperformance. This paper tests portfolios of prior “winning” and “losing” stocks
over several many time periods to see whether there are statistically significant return
differences in the months that follow.
This study was guided by three primary research objectives. First, this study uses
updated monthly return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices to see
whether older patterns explained in the literature still persist today. Second, it uses
two multi-factor asset pricing models to control for factors that were not included in
the older literature. Last, it adds additional robustness checks to determine whether
these results persist when the universe of investable securities is narrowed.
Section 2 of this paper offers a brief literature review. Section 3 outlines the data
and empirical model. Finally, section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results,
followed by a brief conclusion is included in section 5.
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Literature Review

Fama (1970) summarizes arguments supporting weak form, semi-strong form and
strong form efficient views of capital markets. These views concern whether prices
fully reflect various subsets of available information. In weak form efficient markets,
prices fully reflect all available price data. In semi-strong form efficient markets,
prices fully reflect historical price and return data, as well as other publicly available
information including annual reports, new security issues, and so forth. Lastly, in
strong form efficient markets, prices fully reflect all information, including non-public
information.
In order to determine whether a market is efficiently pricing assets, asset pricing
models are needed. One of the earliest and most well-known examples of an asset
pricing model used to determine the intrinsic value of an asset is the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM, developed by Sharpe (1964), Treynor (1962),
Litner (1965), and Mossin (1966), is consistent with the basic portfolio theory that
investors wish to maximize the return of their investments while minimizing the standard deviation, or risk, of said investments.1 In equilibrium, the CAPM dictates
that the expected return of an asset is calculated as Ei = rf + β(Em –rf ), where the
expected return of asset i is equal to the sum of the risk free rate and a market risk
premium. This premium is denoted as Em –rf , where β is the sensitivity of the asset’s
return to the market’s return and Em –rf is the difference between the expected return
of the market and the risk free rate2 .
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) use the CAPM and other techniques to test for market
inefficiencies and predictability in stock returns. They provide empirical evidence of
substantial weak form inefficiencies in the U.S. stock market. They find that “loser”
portfolios which are comprised of the prior poorest performing stocks significantly
1
2
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outperform “winner” portfolios comprised of the prior best performing stocks. They
also show evidence that these systematic price reversals persist as late as five years
after portfolio formation for loser portfolios. They show that loser portfolios outperform the market by, on average, 19.6% 36-months after portfolio formation. They find
that most of these positive abnormal returns are realized in January. January abnormal returns totaled 17.7% during the first 36-months after formation. They credit
this phenomenon to investor overreaction, arguing that investors tend to overreact to
unexpected and dramatic news events.
They also test their hypothesis using the CAPM, as well as simpler marketadjusted excess returns, and market model residuals. Notably, they find no significant
differences in the results of the three models, and ultimately display results for the
market-adjusted excess returns model, denoted as ûit = Rit –Rmt where the residual
for asset i in time t is equal to the difference between the asset’s return and the market’s return over corresponding periods of time. De Bondt and Thaler (1987) build on
this methodology by testing alternative hypotheses for these systematic price reversals. They find that the price reversals in their original research cannot be explained
by differences in idiosyncratic risk or firm size.
Although they credit these forward return differences to investor overreaction, the
outsized impact of January returns on total forward returns cannot be ignored. In a
later paper, Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) argue that pension fund
managers tend to oversell stocks in the fourth quarter that have performed poorly
in order to “window dress” their portfolios, making them appear more impressive.
Research by D’Mello, Ferris, and Hwang (2003) instead suggests that this “January
effect” is driven by tax-loss selling. They find that abnormal selling pressure at year
end by poor performing stocks is primarily the result of investors’ desire to realize
capital losses. Conversely, investors delay realizing capital gains by postponing the
sale of capital gain stocks until the new year.

The January effect is not the only explanation for the price reversals discovered in
De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Conrad and Kaul (1993) argue that the apparent longterm outperformance of prior underperforming stocks is in-part due to measurement
errors, including a bid-ask spread effect, which caused an upward bias when cumulated
over 36-months. They find that this upward bias increases significantly for low-priced
stocks. Using a buy and hold performance measure, they also find that non-January
returns of an arbitrage portfolio of losers and winners did not outperform. They argue
that all outperformance can be explained by abnormal positive January returns, which
are unrelated to past performance. In a later study of momentum trading strategies,
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) eliminate all stocks priced below $5 per share to avoid
the upward bias issue originally discussed in Conrad and Kaul (1993).
In a separate study, Daniel, Hirschleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1988) also look into
the issue of investor under- and overreactions to measure a relationship between past
returns and future returns originally investigated in De Bondt and Thaler (1985).
They show evidence that self-attribution biases can cause short- positive autocorrelation of returns, but that, consistent with De Bondt and Thaler (1985), investor
overreaction can result in a negative relationship between future returns and longterm past stock market and accounting performance.
Vayanos and Woolley (2013) also find evidence of a pattern of momentum and
reversal. However, they arrive at a different explanation for this pattern. They note
that in modern financial markets, investors can hold assets through an index fund
or an actively-managed fund. They argue that outflows of active funds can cause
a price drop for actively-held assets, which is generally expected to continue. This
momentum later reverses over the long-run as investors take advantage of prices that
fell below their intrinsic values. More recent work confirms a pattern of momentum
followed by the long-run price reversals. Daniel and Hirschleifer (2015) also find a
persistent pattern of momentum and reversal. This study argues that this pattern

may be explained in part by investor overconfidence, rather than traditional price
and accounting measures per se.
However, conclusions about market efficiency may be limited by the asset pricing
models they rely on. Since this work by De Bondt and Thaler, significant contributions have been made to the literature regarding asset pricing. Most notably, Fama
and French (1992) develop a three-factor asset pricing model that is far more explanatory of expected stock returns than the CAPM. They test many easily measured
variables, including size, book-to-market equity, leverage, and earnings-price ratios to
determine whether any significantly explain the cross-sectional variation in average
excess stock returns. Ultimately, they find that portfolios of small market capitalization stocks tend to outperform portfolios of large market capitalization stocks and
that portfolios of high book-to-market stocks tend to outperform portfolios low bookto-market stocks. They measure these effects and combine them with the market risk
premium developed in CAPM to explain the variation in excess returns of stocks.
Carhart (1997) confirms that this Fama-French three-factor model is highly explanatory of equity mutual fund performance. However, Carhart also argues that
momentum, when included as a fourth factor, is also explanatory of persistence in
equity mutual fund performance. In fact, the only significant persistence that remains
unexplained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst performing equity mutual funds. More recently, Fama and French (2015) also argue for an expanded
version of their original three-factor model. They find that, in addition to the factors included in their three-factor model, differences in profitability and investment
patterns can explain an additional degree of the cross-sectional variation in stock
returns.

3

Data and Empirical Methodology

3.1

Data

To investigate price reversals in the U.S. stock market, I begin with monthly return
data for U.S. listed stocks from January 1964 to December 2018, compiled by the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The monthly return data, rather
than daily return data, are used to avoid issues highlighted in the literature, including
issues with infrequent trading and bid-ask spreads. Data for the factors included in
the Fama-French and Carhart models are gathered from the Kenneth R. French Data
Library.
For each of the 50 portfolio formation periods, the investment universe is narrowed
to stocks that have six years or more of uninterrupted return data; three years trailing
the portfolio formation date, and three years following the portfolio formation date.
I then generate a portfolio of “winning” stocks and a portfolio of “losing” stocks for
each time period, placing the 35 stocks with the highest trailing three-year Cumulative
Abnormal Return (CAR) into an equal-weighted winner portfolio, and the 35 stocks
with the lower trailing three-year CAR into an equal-weighted loser portfolio. CARs
are calculated as:
CARi =

t=0
X

Rit − Rmt

(1)

t=−35

Rit is the return of security i in month t. Rmt is the return of the market index
in month t. An equally weighted arithmetic average rate of return of all CRSP
listed securities serves as the market index. These abnormal returns, Rit − Rmt , are
cumulated for the 36-months prior to the portfolio formation date. For each time
period i, the 35 stocks with the highest CAR are placed in an equally weighted
“winner” portfolio, and the 35 stocks with the lowest CAR are placed in a “loser”
portfolio. All remaining stocks are removed from the data for that time period.
This process is repeated 50 times, with the first portfolio formation period on

January 1966, and the final portfolio formation period on January 2015. Overlapping
time series are used in order to generate a sample size that is large enough to provide reliable estimators. The empirical methodology section describes the estimation
procedure used to address issues that arise as a result of overlapping time series.
Figure 1 shows the average CARs of 50 loser portfolios (ACARL ) and 50 winner
portfolios (ACARW ) during the first 36-months after portfolio formation. Using an
investment universe of all CRSP listed securities, loser portfolios significantly outperform winner portfolios. 36-months after portfolio formation, the average cumulative
abnormal return for loser portfolios is 91.3%, while the average cumulative abnormal
return for winner portfolios is 20.9%. The cumulative abnormal return differences
between these extreme portfolios after 36-months (ACARL − ACARW ), 70.4%, is far
larger than the original 36-month cumulative abnormal return difference calculated
in De Bondt and Thaler (1985), which totaled 24.6%3 .
Figure 1: Average CARs of 50 Loser Portfolios and 50 Winner Portfolios from
January 1964 to December 2018

3

The original calculation in De Bondt and Thaler (1985) was measured using the average of 16
loser and winner portfolios, rather than 50

As in De Bondt and Thaler (1985), January returns in the updated sample period
still comprise an outsized share of average abnormal return differences between the
extreme portfolios. Average abnormal returns during January (t = 1, t = 13, and
t = 25) totaled 25.5%, and account for more than one-third of the abnormal return
differences between these extreme portfolios.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for these winning and loser portfolios collectively. Note that forward portfolio returns assume an automatic monthly rebalancing.
Panel A represents portfolios generated using all CRSP listed securities as the investment universe. There are several notable characteristics of these portfolios. During
the portfolio formation month, the mean share price across winning and loser portfolios is $10.76, while the mean market capitalization is $418 million. The minimum
mean share price for a portfolio in the data is $0.08, while the minimum mean market capitalization is less than $3.2 million. Therefore, when using all CRSP listed
securities as an investment universe for generating winning and loser portfolios, there
are many nano-cap and micro-cap stocks that enter the portfolios, as well as many
stocks with remarkably low share prices.
In order to test for systematic price reversals on a more typical investment universe, I create Panel B, which generates portfolios based on an investment universe
of CRSP listed securities with a market capitalization over $300 million at portfolio
formation. Therefore, Panel B includes large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap stocks,
but excludes micro-cap and nano-cap stocks. Others have argued that the inclusion
of low-priced stocks may cause the return differences illustrated in De Bondt and
Thaler (1985).4 Therefore, I create Panel C, which generates portfolios based on an
investment universe of CRSP listed securities with share prices at or above $5 during
the portfolio formation month. Note that when market capitalization and share price
thresholds are established, the mean forward monthly return decreases, while the
4
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mean trailing three-year CAR increases. The mean monthly volume also increases.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1)
Mean

(2)
Std. Dev.

(3)
Min.

(4)
Max.

Panel A: Original Portfolios
Monthly Return
0.016
0.091
-0.335
0.731
Monthly Volume
8,951,110 15,100,000 30,936 149,000,000
Trailing 3-Year CAR
0.52
2.76
-2.79
5.34
Share Price (at formation)
10.76
13.58
0.08
65.26
Market Cap. (at formation)
418,354
1,081,466
3,168
8,612,038
Panel B: Market Capitalization Threshold
Monthly Return
0.010
0.078
-0.366
0.534
Monthly Volume
32,300,000 69,100,000 237,526 913,000,000
Trailing 3-Year CAR
0.50
1.70
-1.81
4.53
Share Price (at formation)
31.33
19.09
5.56
94.59
Market Cap. (at formation) 1,818,652 1,819,310 648,461 15,900,000
Panel C: Share Price Threshold
Monthly Return
0.008
0.078
-0.363
0.575
Monthly Volume
14,400,000 37,300,000 59,146 688,000,000
Trailing 3-Year CAR
0.70
2.20
-2.39
5.04
Share Price (at formation)
19.31
12.14
6.92
67.37
Market Cap. (at formation)
745,512
1,572,465 20,784 13,500,000
Table 1. N=3,600 for all variables. Market capitalizations are in thousands.

Figure 2 compares the differences in average cumulative abnormal returns between
losing and winner portfolios for each of these three panels. Panel A, which is the set
of original portfolios generated from the entire universe of CRSP listed securities
experiences an exceptionally large performance difference between loser and winner
portfolios. The difference in cumulative abnormal returns 36-months after formation
is 70.4%, which shows significant outperformance for loser portfolios. When all securities with a market capitalization under $300 million upon formation are removed
from the sample and new portfolios are generated, the difference in cumulative abnormal returns after 36-months falls to 21.6%. Similarly, when stocks priced below

$5 per share are removed from the sample, the difference in cumulative abnormal
returns falls to 21.9%. Loser portfolios still appear to outperform, though to a far
lesser degree.
Figure 2: Differences in Average CARs from January 1964 to December 2018

Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix offer an alternative illustration of the relationship between forward 36-month CARs and average market capitalization. When no
market capitalization threshold is established, most portfolios have very low market
capitalizations, often resulting in very high CARs. A clear negative relationship between mean market capitalization and forward 36-month CAR emerges. As Figure 4
shows, when stocks with market capitalizations under $300 million are removed from
the investment universe, 36-month CARs moderate, and the relationship between
mean market capitalization and forward 36-month CAR is less clear.
Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix illustrate the relationship between forward 36month CARs and mean share prices. As with market capitalization, when there is no
threshold for share prices, many portfolios are formed with very low share prices and
a clear negative relationship between mean share price and forward 36-month CAR

emerges. As Figure 6 shows, when the investment universe is limited with respect to
share price, this relationship becomes less extreme.

3.2

Empirical Methodology

De Bondt and Thaler (1985) estimate investor overreaction and systematic price
reversals by constructing a series of “winning” and “losing” portfolios based on trailing
three-year CARs. They compute t-statistics based on the difference in forward threeyear performance of the winning and loser portfolios.
For this study, I apply the Fama-French five-factor model, and the Carhart fourfactor model to determine whether there are statistically significant return differences
between winning and loser portfolios after controlling for other contributors to expected stock returns. I introduce a dummy variable to each factor model. Equation
2 represents the Fama-French specification, while Equation 3 represents the Carhart
specification.
Rit − RF t = αi + β0 + β1 (RM − RF )it + β2 SM Bit + β3 HM Lit
(2)
+ β4 RM Wit + β5 CM Ait + β6 Loserit + uit

Rit − RF t = αi + β0 + β1 (RM − RF )it + β2 SM Bit + β3 HM Lit
(3)
+ β4 M OMit + β5 Loserit + uit
In both specifications, the dependent variable is a risk premium for security i where
Rit is the return for security i in time t and RF t is a risk-free rate in time t. The
risk-free rate is the yield on a one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. As with the CAPM,
RM –RF t is the market risk premium denoted as the risk-free rate, subtracted from
the return of a market index in time t. SM Bt denotes the size premium in time
t. That is, the average return of three small market capitalization portfolios minus

the average return of three large market capitalization portfolios. HM Lt represents
the value premium, that is the average return difference between portfolios of high
book-to-market “value stocks” and low book-to-market “growth stocks.”
RM Wt is the profitability premium in time t, which represents the average return
of two portfolios of robust operating profitability stocks minus the average return of
two portfolios comprised of weak operating profitability stocks. CM At , an investment premium, represents the return difference between two conservative investment
portfolios minus the average return on two aggressive investment portfolios. The independent variable of interest, Losert , is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the observation is a portfolio of stocks with a low trailing three-year CAR, and takes
the value of 0 if the observation is a portfolio of stocks with high trailing three-year
CAR.
Specification three does not include RMW and CMA factors. Instead, it includes
M OMt , which is the average return on two high prior return portfolios minus the
average return on low prior return portfolios. Note that momentum is a measure of
shorter-run autocorrelation, and does not capture autocorrelation of returns over a
period of several years, which is the aim of this paper.

3.3

Generalized Least Squares

Many studies use overlapping time series data to improve estimation reliability. For
the purposes of this study, a three-year estimation period is used from January 1967
to December 1969, another from January 1968 to December 1970, and so on. The
overlapping time series approach can make OLS parameter estimates less reliable.
Past studies have applied Newey-West standard errors to OLS in order to address
this issue. However, Harri and Brorsen (2009) summarize the various estimation
techniques and conclude that generalized least squares (GLS) estimators are generally
preferred for handling the overlapping sample horizon issue.

GLS estimators are also more efficient than OLS estimators when heteroscedasticity is present. To determine whether heteroscedasticity is present, I run the BreuschPagan test. For the original panel of data, which uses an investment universe of
all CRSP listed securities, the Fama-French five-factor model produces a p-value of
0.0028, while the Carhart four-factor model produces a p-value of 0.0000. Results are
similar when tested on other panels, which exclude low market capitalization stocks
and low-priced stocks. Therefore, these results soundly reject the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity.
GLS estimators allow for more efficient estimation of samples with overlapping
time series and also allow for more efficient estimation of the models given the presence
of heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the GLS estimation technique has been used in
several recent studies on expected stock and hedge fund returns.5

3.4

Multicollinearity

Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients for Panel A, portfolios based on a universe
of all CRSP listed securities. Coefficients for the other panels are similar. Hanke
and Winchern (2008) explain that correlations among independent variables between
-0.5 and 0.5 do not result in estimation issues. Correlations between independent
variables are generally low for these data, but one issue does arise. A correlation
coefficient of 0.7 arises between factors HML and CMA. Ordinarily, this may indicate
the presence of multicollinearity. I report GLS estimates for both the Fama-French
five-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model. The Carhart four-factor model
does not include the CMA factor, which alleviates these concerns. Moreover, the GLS
estimates for these models are quite similar.
5
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients

MktRF
SMB
HML
MOM
RMW
CMA
Loser

4

Panel A: Original Portfolios
MktRF SMB HML MOM RMW
1
0.279
1
-0.255 -0.067
1
-0.174 -0.093 -0.187
1
-0.249 -0.359 0.054 0.124
1
-0.393 -0.095 0.697 -0.001 -0.022
0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 0.0005

CMA

Loser

1
-0.009

1

Results

GLS regressions are on the monthly risk premia, Rit –RF t , on 50 winner portfolios
and 50 loser portfolios in each of the first 36-months after formation. The first column
displays the GLS estimates for the Fama-French five-factor model, on a universe of
all CRSP listed securities. The coefficient estimate for the Loser dummy variable is
positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. The coefficient estimate
indicates that, and holding Fama-French factors constant, loser portfolios outperform
winner portfolios by 3.2% per month in each of the first 36-months after formation.
Results for the Carhart model are similar, showing that loser portfolios outperform
winner portfolios by about 3.1% per month.
However, as the third and fourth regressions show, when securities with a market
capitalization of less than $300 million are removed from the data, the dummy variable
is no longer statistically significant. Therefore, on a standard investment universe
consisting of low-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap stocks, there is no statistically significant
difference between investing portfolios of prior winning stocks and portfolios of prior
losing stocks.

Market Capitalization Threshold
Share Price
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.016***
0.015***
0.015***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.007***
0.007***
0.011***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.006***
−0.009***
−0.008***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.008***
(0.001)
−0.002
−0.001
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.000
0.000
(0.003)
(0.004)
0.008
0.008
0.011
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
−0.392***
−0.386***
−0.396***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
3,600
3,600
3,600
355.90
416.53
358.56
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.011
(0.009)
−0.389***
(0.007)
3,600
420.21
0.0000

Threshold
(6)
0.013***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.002)
−0.011***
(0.002)
−0.009***
(0.001)

Table 3. Stars denote statistical significance (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1) respectively.

Observations
Wald Chi2
Prob. > Chi2

Constant

Loser

CMA

RMW

MOM

HML

SMB

MktRF

Original Portfolios
(1)
(2)
0.015***
0.014***
(0.001)
(0.002)
0.013***
0.013***
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.008***
−0.012***
(0.003)
(0.002)
−0.010***
(0.001)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.004)
0.032***
0.031***
(0.009)
(0.009)
−0.396***
−0.388***
(0.007)
(0.007)
3,600
3,600
369.54
435.42
0.0000
0.0000

Table 3: GLS Estimates

Likewise, the fifth and six regressions show that there is also no statistically significant difference between winning and loser portfolios when securities priced below $5
per share upon portfolio formation are removed from the data. P-values for these coefficient estimates can be found in Table 5 in the Appendix. Overall, while it initially
appears that there are significant positive returns to investing in stocks with prior
poor returns, these returns appear to be driven by nano-cap and micro-cap stocks, as
well as low-priced stocks
Consistently, the market risk premium, the size premium, and the value premium
are all statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. The momentum factor, which
was included in the Carhart four-factor model is also consistently statistically significant. While prior three-year CARs do not appear indicative of future returns on the
restricted investment universes in regressions three through six, the market risk premium and the size premium do contribute positively to stock returns. In this sample,
the value premium and the momentum factor contribute negatively to returns.
Table 3 also displays the results of the Wald Chi-Squared test of joint significance
for these models. The results show that, collectively, the independent variables are
explanatory of the risk premium, and that the models are well-fitting. These results
are also robust to different quantities of securities placed in portfolios. Table 3 displays results for equal-weighted portfolios of 35 stocks. To demonstrate robustness,
these regressions were performed on winner and loser portfolios comrpised of different
numbers of securities. Table 6 in the Appendix shows that when 15 stocks, rather
than 35 stocks, are placed in each portfolio, the results are quite similar. Additionally,
when the top and bottom percentiles of stocks according to trailing 36-month CARs
are placed in winner and loser portfolios respectively, estimates remain consistent.

5

Conclusion

Using the methodology originally used in De Bondt and Thaler (1985), the data show
that the apparent pattern of prior poor performing stocks outperforming portfolios
of prior well-performing stocks persists. However, these return differences are driven
by nano-cap and micro-cap stocks, as well as by low-priced stocks. On investment
universes that consist only of small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap stocks, or consisting
of stocks with share prices above $5, there is no statistically significant difference
between winning and loser portfolios.
The January effect is also an outsized contributor to the investment performance of
loser portfolios that are not limited by market capitalization and share price. Though
the January effect on this updated dataset is less extreme than in De Bondt and Thaler
(1985), it still accounts for more than one-third of the difference in forward 36-month
CARs between loser and winner portfolios.
The results suggest that these return differences are not evidence of investor overreaction or of a systematic and exploitable long-run return pattern. Rather, when
using the broadest possible U.S. investment universe, loser portfolios are often comprised of very small and very low-priced stocks. Price changes in these stocks are
unlikely to impact index returns, they are likely overlooked by institutional investors,
and their shares tend to be less liquid and subject to infrequent trading. Moreover,
arbitrage portfolios that aim to exploit this apparent pattern would likely leave investors highly exposed to distressed companies and stocks that experience infrequent
trading.
Though these results allow for additional criticism of De Bondt and Thaler (1985),
there are several limitations. Consistent with their original methodology, this paper
cumulates, rather than compounds, trailing three-year abnormal returns. Moreover,
forward three-year portfolio returns assume an automatic monthly rebalancing. This
assumption is rigid, and it may be preferable to calculate portfolio returns based

on weights that that change based on performance, and are not rebalanced on a
monthly basis. Beyond this, there are additional factor models that could be tested,
and additional econometric techniques that could be applied. Furthermore, the GLS
results are robust to different portfolio compositions, it would be beneficial to test
different numbers of test periods. Results would also be more robust if different test
period durations were tested.
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Appendix
Figure 3: Market Capitalization and 36-month CARs for 50 Loser Portfolios and 50
Winner Portfolios
(Investment Universe: All CRSP Securities)

Figure 4: Market Capitalization and 36-month CARs for 50 Loser Portfolios and 50
Winner Portfolios
(Investment Universe: Securities with Market Capitalizations above $300 million)

Figure 5: Share Price and 36-month CARs for 50 Loser Portfolios and 50 Winner
Portfolios
(Investment Universe: All CRSP Securities)

Figure 6: Share Price and 36-month CARs for 50 Loser Portfolios and 50 Winner
Portfolios
(Investment Universe: Securities with Share Prices above $5)

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients (All Panels)
Panel A: Original Portfolios
SMB HML MOM RMW

MktRF
SMB
HML
MOM
RMW
CMA
Loser

MktRF
SMB
HML
MOM
RMW
CMA
Loser

MktRF
SMB
HML
MOM
RMW
CMA
Loser

MktRF
CMA Loser
1
0.279
1
-0.255 -0.067
1
-0.174 -0.093 -0.187
1
-0.249 -0.359 0.054 0.124
1
-0.393 -0.095 0.697 -0.001 -0.022
1
0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 0.0005 -0.009
1
Panel B: Market Capitalization Threshold
MktRF SMB HML MOM RMW CMA Loser
1
0.272
1
-0.276 -0.079
1
-0.136 -0.056 -0.191
1
-0.236 -0.368 0.079 0.104
1
-0.399 -0.090 0.704 -0.005 -0.010
1
0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
1
Panel C: Share Price Threshold
MktRF SMB HML MOM RMW CMA Loser
1
0.270
1
-0.278 -0.080
1
-0.147 -0.073 -0.193
1
-0.237 -0.363 0.072 0.105
1
-0.40
-0.094 0.703 -0.009 -0.0129
1
0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007
1

Table 5: P-values for Loser Dummy Variable
Original Portfolios
(1)
(2)
z
3.49
3.47
P > |z| 0.000
0.001

Mkt. Cap. Threshold
(3)
(4)
0.85
0.86
0.394
0.390

Price Threshold
(5)
(6)
1.25
1.24
0.210
0.215

−0.004
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.009)
−0.396***
(0.007)
3,600
369.54
0.0000
0.031***
(0.009)
−0.388***
(0.007)
3,600
435.42
0.0000

(2)
0.014***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)
−0.012***
(0.002)
−0.010***
(0.001)

Top Percentile
(5)
(6)
0.015***
0.014***
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.013***
0.013***
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.008***
−0.012***
(0.003)
(0.002)
−0.010***
(0.001)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.004)
0.032***
0.032***
(0.009)
(0.009)
−0.397***
−0.389***
(0.007)
(0.007)
3,600
3,600
374.66
441.38
0.0000
0.0000

Table 6. Stars denote statistical significance (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1) respectively.

Observations
Wald Chi2
Prob. > Chi2

Constant

Loser

CMA

RMW

MOM

HML

SMB

MktRF

(1)
0.015***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.002)
−0.008***
(0.003)

35 Stocks

Panel A: Original Portfolios
15 Stocks
(3)
(4)
0.016***
0.014***
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.012***
0.012***
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.008***
−0.013***
(0.003)
(0.002)
−0.011***
(0.001)
−0.005*
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.036
0.035***
(0.009)
(0.009)
−0.398***
−0.390***
(0.007)
(0.007)
3,600
3,600
344.79
414.83
0.0000
0.0000

Table 6: GLS Estimates for Alternative Portfolio Compositions

